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Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is 
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was 
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as 
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & light Co.. 
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). 
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A.'s Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment and for 
Relief from Judgment [R. 91-95]. 
POINT H. DJL's COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DISMISS THE 
COMPLAINT. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is 
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was 
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as 
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). 
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A.'s Complaint [R. 1-4], 
D.A.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [R. 43-47] and 
in D.A.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to 
Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment [R. 95-97]. 
POINT m . DID THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDER THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON A 
MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS FILED RAISING 
THAT DEFENSE? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is 
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was 
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as 
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). 
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Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A/s Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment and for 
Relief from Judgment [R. 96-97]. 
POINT IV. BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT, AND THE 
TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN, THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR DA.'S CLAIMS OF QUANTUM 
MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is 
"correctness11 since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was 
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as 
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). 
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A/s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [R. 40-41] and in D.A.'s Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment 
and for Relief from Judgment [R. 95-97]. 
POINT V. THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS ON 
THE PART OF DA. IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE OR 
FINDING OF FACT. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is 
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was 
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as 
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). 
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A.'s Objections to Proposed 
[revised] Order Dismissing Case [R. 145-147], in D.A.'s Objections to Proposed Order 
Dismissing Case [R.172-175], and in D.A.'s Objections to Proposed [second revised] 
Order Dismissing Case [R. 176-179]. 
POINT VI IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO CONSIDER 
DA.'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTING A CLAIM FOR AN 
EQUITABLE LIEN. 
vii 
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Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is 
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was 
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as 
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995). 
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.AA Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint and Amended Complaint. [R. 49-55]. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, 
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
is against the law. 
(7) Error in law. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 20030032-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action by plaintiff Development Associates, Inc. (hereinafter 
f!D.A.M) to recover from defendant Gene Peaden (hereinafter "Peaden") in quantum 
meruit or unjust enrichment the reasonable value of D.A.'s costs and services in 
installing and completing improvements to real property owned by Peaden or the value 
of the benefit conferred upon Peaden by D.A. 
Course of Proceedings 
D.A. filed a complaint on March 8, 2002, alleging claims for quantum meruit 
and unjust enrichment in three separate causes of action. On April 8, 2002, Peaden 
filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that D.A.'s claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations of §78-12-25, U.C.A., and that D.A.'s work was for its own benefit and the 
1 
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benefit to Peaden was incidental. D.A. served on Peaden its Affidavit and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Complaint with the Amended Complaint attached and Request for Hearing on April 
25, 2002. Peaden file a Reply Memorandum, Alternative Motion for More Definite 
Statement and Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Complaint on May 30, 2002. The lower court, without a hearing and without 
considering D.A.'s Affidavit and Memorandum in Opposition, entered a Minute Entry 
Decision and Order on June 27, 2002, granting Peaden's Motion to Dismiss. 
On July 7, 2002, D.A. filed a Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To 
Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment, with supporting affidavit and 
memorandum, and after opposing and reply memoranda, a hearing on that motion was 
scheduled for September 23, 2002. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
At the hearing on September 23, 2002, the lower court disingenuously 
denied that it had dismissed the complaint for late-filing of opposition and proceeded 
to hear the merits of the Motion to Dismiss. It granted that motion from the bench. 
Peaden's attorney prepared a proposed Order Dismissing Case which contained 
numerous statements of facts and conclusions which were not in the record before the 
court and had not been found or concluded by the lower court. After D.A. filed three 
separate objections to the proposed Order Dismissing Case, the lower court, on 
December 2, 2002, entered the Order Dismissing Case, which contains unauthorized 
findings and conclusions. This appeal followed. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) On March 8, 2002, plaintiff D.A. filed a complaint for unjust 
enrichment against defendant alleging the following facts [R. 1-4]: 
(1) Plaintiff is and has been the owner of numerous residential lots 
in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions located at approximately 13800 South 
and 4800 West in Salt Lake County which were unimproved at the time they were 
acquired, having no approved roads, curb & gutter, and no connections to water, sewer, 
power, fuel and telephone systems, and for which it was impossible to obtain building 
permits for the construction of homes thereon. 
(2) Defendant was and is the owner of Lots 320, 322 and 334, The 
Foothills Plat "B" Subdivision, and Lots 379, 380 and 555, The Foothills Plat "C" 
Subdivision, which were similarly unimproved and for which it was impossible for 
defendant to obtain building permits for the construction of homes thereon. 
(3) In order to obtain building permits on its lots, plaintiff was 
required by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City to install and complete all 
subdivision improvements, not just for the lots owned by it, but for all lots located 
within The Foothills Plats MB" and "C" Subdivisions. 
(4) Before proceeding to install and complete the subdivision 
improvements, plaintiff contacted defendant and made defendant aware of the 
requirement to install and complete all improvements in the entire subdivisions and 
requested defendant to agree to reimburse plaintiff for his share of the costs of such 
3 
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improvements prorated to the lots owned by him if plaintiff installed and completed 
such improvements so that defendant could obtain building permits for his lots. 
(5) Defendant acknowledged the need to install such 
improvements and that such improvements would benefit him and increase the value 
of the lots owned by him and encouraged and requested plaintiff to proceed with the 
installation of such improvements. 
(6) Plaintiff thereafter completed all such improvements as 
required by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City for the benefit of all lots in The 
Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions at a total cost of $2,381,302 for Plat "B" and 
$3,134,044 for Plat "C". These amounts, prorated to the 159 lots in Plat "B", equals 
$14,977.00 per lot in Plat "B", and to the 200 lots in Plat "C, equals $15,670.22. 
Defendant's prorata share of those costs for his six lots is $91,941.66. 
(7) Defendant requested plaintiff to install the improvements 
which would also improve his lots. 
(8) Plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for such 
improvements. 
(9) Defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff expected 
to be so compensated. 
(10) Defendant is obligated to reimburse plaintiff the reasonable 
value of plaintiff's services in installing and completing the improvements, which plaintiff 
alleges is $91,941.66, plus fifteen percent for overhead and developer fees, together with 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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interest thereon at the legal rate, both before and after judgment, from the time such 
services were performed until paid. 
(11) Defendant has received the benefit of six fully improved lots 
in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C Subdivisions on which building permits can now be 
obtained. 
(12) Defendant had and has an appreciation or knowledge of the 
benefit conferred upon him. 
(13) It would be unjust for the defendant to retain that benefit 
without paying for it. 
(14) Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant the value of the 
benefit conferred which plaintiff alleges is $45,000 per lot or a total of $270,000. 
(15) Defendant has received, accepted and retained benefits which 
in equity and justice belong to plaintiff. 
(16) Defendant should be required to pay for the benefits received 
by him, which plaintiff alleges is $45,000 per lot or a total of $270,000. 
(b) The summons/complaint were served on Peaden March 18, 2002. 
[R. 101,12]. 
(c) Peaden filed his Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum 
presenting matters outside the pleadings, on April 8, 2002, at 6:51. p.m. [R. 5-23]. 
(d) D.A. served its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss [R.39-48], Affidavit of Steven R. Young in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
[R.34-37], Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint with the Amended Complaint 
5 
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attached [R.49-55] and Request for Hearing [R.56-57] on both motions on Thursday, 
April 25, 2002. The originals were apparently not recorded as filed until Monday, April 
29,2002. 
(e) Peaden's attorney's secretary telephoned D.A.'s attorney on May 
14, 2002, and requested an extension of time until Monday, May 20, 2002, to file a reply 
to Peaden's memorandum and Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. That 
request was granted. [Marsh Affidavit, 115, R. 102]. 
(f) On Tuesday, May 21, 2002, Peaden's attorney's secretary again 
telephoned D.A,'s attorney and requested another extension of time until Friday, May 
25, 2002. That request was granted. [Marsh Affidavit, 116, R. 102]. 
(g) Peaden's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss [R. 
58-71], Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement [R. 72-74], Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and in Support 
of Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement [R. 75-79] were filed on May 30, 
2002, at 5:51 p.m. and mailed to D.A.'s attorney the same day. 
(h) Peaden filed a Notice to Submit for Decision [R. 80-82] on June 
14, 2002, stating that oral argument had been requested by one or more of the parties 
and referencing Peaden's Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion for More Definite 
Statement and memoranda in support thereof and D.A.'s memoranda and affidavit and 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. 
(i) D.A. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Peaden's Motion for 
More Definite Statement on June 25, 2002 [R. 85-87]. 
6 
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(j) The Court entered its Minute Entry Decision and Order, dated 
June 26, 2002, on June 27, 2002 [R. 83-84]. In that order the lower court stated: 
Before the Court is Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss dated April 8, 2002 and Defendant's Alternative 
Motion for More Definite Statement filed on May 30,2002, and 
submitted on its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having noted 
no timely opposition being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE 
APPEARING, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. This 
constitutes the Order of the Court. 
(k) On July 7, 2002, D.A. filed a Motion to Amend Findings, For New 
Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment [R.88-89], with 
supporting affidavit [R. 101-104] and memorandum [R. 90-100], 
(1) On July 23, 2002, Peaden filed his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and 
for Relief From Judgment [R. 111-122]. 
(m) On July 25, 2002, D.A. filed its Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and For 
Relief from Judgment [R. 123-126]. 
(n) D.A.'s Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or 
Amend Judgment and For Relief from Judgment was scheduled to be heard on 
September 23, 2002 [R. 136]. At that hearing the lower court stated, disingenuously, 
that it had not dismissed the case, on June 26, 2002, based on late filing of D.A.'s 
Memorandum and Affidavit (as the court stated in its Minute Entry and Order of that 
7 
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date) but rather on the merits and that it would proceed to hear Peaden's Motion to 
Dismiss on the merits and granted that motion from the bench. 
(o) On October 14, 2002, Peaden submitted a proposed Order 
Dismissing Case which contained numerous proposed "findings" and "conclusions" and 
"orders" which were not supported in the record and were not actually found or 
concluded by the lower court in its ruling from the bench. Among the proposed orders 
was an order of expungement of the Notice of Interest and an Order quieting title to 
the property in Peaden. 
The so-called "undisputed facts" included: 
(i) a statement that Peaden "did not agree or represent to the plaintiff 
that he would pay for the improvements made or to be made by the plaintiff," which 
is contrary to the allegation in H7 of the Complaint and 1f7 of Mr. Young's affidavit, 
which must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss; 
(ii) a statement that plaintiff represented to the lower court that the 
Notice of Interest "was recorded by the plaintiff before the improvements to plats B and 
C of the sub-division were made," and that plaintiffs counsel represented that "plaintiff 
would have previously removed its Notice of Interest... had such request been made 
pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had not been made to 
numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was filed," neither of which finds 
support in the record and neither of which is true; 
8 
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(iii) a statement that the report from Riverton City "reflects that many 
of the improvements to Foothills plat B were made before the end of 1997," which is 
not true. At most the report reflects that "some" improvements had been made. 
(p) DA. filed Objections to Proposed Order Dismissing Case [R. 145-
147] on October 23, 2002, objecting to any findings of fact outside of those contained 
in the complaint or in the affidavit submitted by D.A., objecting to some of those 
specific findings as not supported in the record, objecting to specific conclusions of law 
as not supported by the findings nor the facts and as contradictory to others, and 
objecting to proposed orders which would grant affirmative relief to Peaden, which was 
inappropriate on a Motion to Dismiss. 
(q) On October 25,2002, Peaden submitted a revised proposed Order 
Dismissing Case [R. 150-159] which still contained numerous inappropriate "findings," 
"conclusions" and "orders." 
(r) On October 29, 2002, D.A. filed Objections to Proposed [revised] 
Order Dismissing Case [R. 172-175] making the same objections as before. 
(s) On October 30,2002, Peaden submitted a second revised proposed 
Order Dismissing Case [R. 162-171] deleting one of the proposed orders granting 
affirmative relief. 
(t) On November 4, 2002, D.A. filed Objections to Proposed [second 
revised] Order Dismissing Case [R. 176-179] making the same objections as before. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(u) After a hearing on D.A/s objections to the proposed order 
prepared by defendant's counsel, the lower court entered an Order Dismissing Case on 
December 2, 2002. [R. 182-191]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WAS THE MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER OF JUNE 2<S, 
2002 ISSUED BASED ON LATE FILING OF OPPOSING 
MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT, AS IT STATES, OR WAS IT ISSUED 
ON THE MERITS, AND WAS THIS IRREGULARITY IN THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT, SURPRISE OR AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHICH PREVENTED A FAIR TRIAL OR HEARING? 
The lower court's order of June 26, 2002, was based on late filing of 
opposing memorandum and affidavit. At a later hearing the court denied that the late 
filing was the basis of its decision, even though the order so stated, and stated that it 
had ruled on the merits and, after some argument, ruled from the bench dismissing the 
case on the merits. This irregularity in the proceedings of the court, the abuse of 
discretion and the surprise involved in the court's obvious failure to consider the merits, 
then stating disingenuously that it did consider the merits thus prejudging the matter 
before it heard the arguments and carefully reviewed the affidavits and memoranda, 
with the natural disinclination to change the decision which it just announced, 
constitutes grounds for reversal of the dismissal. 
POINT H. DA.'s COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DISMISS THE 
COMPLAINT. 
A motion to dismiss accepts all of the facts stated in the complaint as true. 
The complaint clearly set forth all of the required elements of unjust enrichment, 
quoting the language of the Utah cases which define a cause of action for unjust 
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enrichment and alleging the facts which support that cause. Since those are the only 
facts before the court, it was error for the lower court to dismiss the complaint. 
POINT HI. DID THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDER THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON A 
MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS FILED RAISING 
THAT DEFENSE? 
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is normally raised 
in the Answer to a Complaint. The facts as to when the cause of action arose and 
whether the statute of limitations was tolled by defendant's absence from the state, as 
well as other matters, do not appear on the face of the complaint and may not be 
known until discovery is conducted. In order to justify a dismissal, it must be 
demonstrated that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff might succeed. The 
court did not and could not have known all possible sets of facts when it dismissed the 
complaint. 
POINT IV, BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT, AND THE 
TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN, THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR DA.'S CLAIMS OF QUANTUM 
MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT-
The only evidence before the lower court was contained in an affidavit 
submitted by D.A. which stated that improvements in the subdivision were installed 
after 1997 and continuing to the present because all improvements had not yet been 
completed. There was nothing in the documents submitted by Peaden from which the 
court could find that all improvements were installed during or before 1997. Thus, the 
court could not properly determine the date on which the cause of action arose and 
could not, therefore, conclude that the statute of limitations had expired. 
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POINT V. THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS ON 
THE PART OF DA. IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE OR 
FINDING OF FACT. 
The only evidence before the lower court were the facts stated in the 
complaint and a copy of the Notice of Interest. There was no evidence before the court 
upon which a finding or conclusion of "unclean hands" could be based. Rather, the only 
evidence indicated that Peaden had been benefitted in the amount of approximately 
$270,000 by the improvements installed by D.A. for which Peaden refused to pay. That 
makes D.A. the "white knight" in this case and Peaden the person with "unclean hands." 
Equity is totally on the side of D.A. and the court's conclusion of "unclean hand" must 
be reversed. 
POINT VI. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO CONSIDER 
DA.'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTING A CLAIM FOR AN 
EQUITABLE LIEN. 
The lower court did not reach this issue because it dismissed the complaint 
but on remand the lower court should be directed to consider the Amended Complaint 
so that fair and complete relief may be given to D.A. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WAS THE MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER 
OF JUNE 26, 2002 ISSUED BASED ON LATE FILING OF 
OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT, AS IT 
STATES, OR WAS IT ISSUED ON THE MERITS, AND WAS 
THIS IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
COURT, SURPRISE OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
WHICH PREVENTED A FAIR TRIAL OR HEARING? 
The lower court, on June 26, 2002, issued an Order granting Peaden's 
Motion to Dismiss. That Order recites that the court only had before it Peaden's 
Motion to Dismiss and his Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement and then 
stated "having noted no timely opposition being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE 
APPEARING, the Motion to Dismiss is granted." The clear meaning of this Order was 
that the court did not consider the Affidavit and Memorandum filed by D.A. and that 
the basis of the decision was "no timely opposition being filed," rather than a decision 
on the merits of the motion. While this issue was later technically resolved when the 
lower court stated, at the hearing on September 23, 2002, on D.A.'s Motion to Amend 
Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and For Relief from Judgment, 
that it had not dismissed the case for late-filing of opposition but on the merits and 
would proceed to hear the merits again at that time, the lower court was disingenuous 
in so stating.1 This is important only because once the court has stated that it did 
1
 In its Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and 
For Relief from Judgment, D.A. clearly pointed out that dismissal for late-filing was 
improper, including the following grounds: (1) that the court had no knowledge of whether 
the parties had agreed to an extension of time to file the opposing documents; (2) no 
objection or motion to strike the opposing documents had been filed by Peaden, which is 
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dismiss the case on the merits, even though it had not considered the merits, it has 
taken a position on the merits before it heard argument thereon and carefully examined 
the memoranda and affidavits and was highly unlikely to change that position. This was 
confirmed to the undersigned when the lower court immediately ruled from the bench 
in denying all aspects of the Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or 
Amend Judgment and For Relief From Judgment. The lower court's failure to consider 
the merits will become apparent as we review those merits in the following points. 
The point here is that the lower court's handling of this matter constitutes 
irregularity in the proceedings, surprise or abuse of discretion which prevented a fair 
trial or hearing on the merits of the case. D.A. filed a Motion for New Trial in the 
lower court under Rule 59(a), U.R.CP. That motion was based on subdivisions (1) and 
(3) of that Rule, for procedural reasons, and on subdivisions (6) and (7), for substantive 
reasons. The procedural basis of that motion will be discussed in this point and the 
substantive reasons in the following points. 
usually a waiver of the late-filing; (3) a just determination of the matter required the court 
to consider all opposing documents which it had before it; (3) D.A. had filed a Request for 
Hearing [R. 56] on the Motion to Dismiss; (4) Rule 4-501(3), Rules of Judicial 
Administration, requires a hearing "where the granting of a motion would dispose of the 
action . . . on the merits11 "unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the 
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue . . . has been authoritatively decided" and 
the court made no such finding; (5) Peaden had filed a Notice to Submit for Decision [R. 
80-81] specifically making reference to the opposing documents, which was the means by 
which the Motion to Dismiss was brought to the lower court's attention; and (6) surprise at 
the court's failure to consider opposing documents in the file and the dismissal of the case 
without a hearing. 
With all due respect to the lower court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that 
the lower court was embarrassed by summary dismissal without considering the merits and 
simply stated that it had not dismissed for late-filing but on the merits. 
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Peaden's Motion to Dismiss presenting matters outside the pleadings 
was, pursuant to Rule 12(b), to be treated as a motion for summary judgment under 
Rule 56. A Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial following a summary judgment is 
"procedurally correct." Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson. 797 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 
App. 1990): Moon Lake Electric Assoc, v. Ultrasystems Western Constr., 767 P.2d 125, 
127 (Utah App. 1988), in which it was stated: 
"[t]he concept of a new trial under Rule 59 is broad enough to 
include a rehearing of any matter decided by the court without 
a juiy." 11 A. Wright & C. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure §2804 (1973). 
D.A. was, therefore, entitled to a new trial or hearing on this matter upon the following 
grounds provided in Rule 59(a): 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, . • . or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
The court's Minute Entry Decision And Order, which granted the motion 
to dismiss, was apparently based upon the Court's statement that "no timely opposition 
being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING,...." An affidavit and memorandum 
in opposition had been filed and, although it was timely served on Peaden's attorney on 
Thursday, April 25, 2002,2 it was apparently not received by the clerk of the court until 
2 
Under Rule 4-501(l)(B), Rules of Judicial Administration, a memorandum in opposition 
to a motion is due "within ten days after service of a motion," and, Under Rule 6(a), 
U.R.C.P., "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any 
additional time provided under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." Thus, April 13,14,20 and 
21, Saturdays and Sundays, would be excluded and 3 days would be added, pursuant to Rule 
6(e), U.R.C.P., extending the time to respond to the April 8 Motion to Dismiss until April 
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the following Monday, making the filing only two days late. The court, of course, has 
no knowledge as to whether an extension of time had been granted by Peaden's 
attorney to respond to the motion. On that ground alone, it was irregular or an abuse 
of discretion for the court to disregard the memorandum and affidavit which had been 
filed in opposition to the motion and which were in the file and available to the Court 
at the time the Minute Entry Decision was made and entered. Furthermore, since the 
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action," Rule 1(a), U.R.C.P., and the purpose of the 
Rules of Judicial Administration "is to bring order to the manner in which the courts 
operate . . [and] n o t . . . to create or modify substantive rights of litigants, . . ." Scott 
v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App. 1999), it was irregular and an abuse of 
discretion to deny D.A. of its substantive rights to pursue its claims by dismissing its 
complaint. It was further irregular and an abuse of discretion for the court to find 
"GOOD CAUSE APPEARING" when no basis for the good cause is stated or appears 
in the record. 
Ordinarily, discrepancies and untimeliness in the filing of affidavits or other 
documents are waived unless objected to by the opposing party. No objection having 
been filed by Peaden, it was irregular and an abuse of discretion for the court to grant 
the motion to dismiss on its own. By granting the motion to dismiss, the court has 
prevented D.A. from having a fair trial or consideration of its claims. Fair consideration 
of D.A.'s claims requires that the responses to Peaden's motion be reviewed by the 
25. 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court. Those responses included an affidavit setting forth specific facts and legal 
authorities relevant to the arguments raised in the motion to dismiss. Without a 
consideration of those facts and authorities, D.A. was denied a fair consideration of its 
claims. 
The undersigned is aware of the previous direction by the judges in the 
Third District that default certificates and judgments not be entered until a few days 
after the expiration of the time for filing a response to a complaint to discourage those 
who would take advantage of a late filing by only a few days. It would seem that the 
same reasoning should apply to a late filed memorandum. In fact, the late filing of a 
memorandum is not comparable to the failure to file an answer where, under the rules, 
a default may be entered. Even in that situation, as stated in Heathman v. Fabian & 
Clendenin. 14 U.2d 60, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962): 
No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment 
by default without a hearing on the merits. The courts, in the 
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and 
complete opportunity for a hearing on the merit of every case. 
Even in the case of a default judgment, the court is sometimes obligated to hold a 
hearing and take evidence and the party in default must be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard under Rule 55(a)(2), U.R.C.P. There is greater reason to 
apply that principle here. 
Whether or not the court considers the affidavit and memoranda in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the court must make a ruling on the merits based 
on the facts and the law. The opposing affidavit and memoranda offer guidance to the 
court with respect to those facts and the law. Without those affidavits and memoranda, 
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presumably the court would seek the same information from the file or by research. 
Thus, consideration of the opposing affidavit and memoranda is only helpful to the 
court. 
Most importantly, Peaden's motion to dismiss was brought to the Court's 
attention by means of his Notice to Submit for Decision, dated June 14, 2002, which 
stated that "Oral argument has been requested by one or more of the parties" and 
further referred to the motions, memoranda and affidavits which had been submitted 
by both parties in support of or in opposition to the motion. That being the means by 
which the matter was brought to the court's attention, the court should have, at least, 
considered the motions, memoranda and affidavits referred to therein and, at most, 
scheduled a hearing thereon, as was the expectation of both parties. Under Rule 4-
501(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, a request for hearing "where the granting of 
a motion would dispose of the action or any claim in the action on the merits with 
prejudice" "shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided." The court did not 
find the matter to be frivolous or authoritatively decided. Therefore, the request for 
a hearing should have been granted. Furthermore, under the same rule, "when a 
request for a hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party." This was 
not done. Under this rule, a hearing should have been scheduled and the failure to do 
so, and to consider the documents in the file and referred to in the Notice was irregular 
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or an abuse of discretion which prevented plaintiff from having a fair hearing on the 
merits of its claims. 
2. Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against 
D.A.'s attorney was surprised by the Court's refusal to consider the 
memoranda and affidavit filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss. His experience 
in matters of this kind in the past is that courts accept and consider all documents filed, 
whether or not timely filed, unless the opposing party objects or files a motion to strike 
the late filed documents. When that has occurred, the filing of a motion under Rule 
6(b), U.R.C.P., to accept and consider the late filed documents has given the court an 
opportunity to consider all relevant factors including whether a ruling will deprive a 
party of the just determination of his cause, the prejudice to either party, excusable 
neglect, and whether the information in the documents would be helpful to the court 
in ruling on the merits of the motion. When a request for hearing has been filed and 
granted, the parties have the opportunity to inform the court about these matters. The 
undersigned does not recall ever being successful in getting a court to refuse to consider 
untimely documents filed by another party even in egregious cases and this is the first 
time, in his experience, that a court has dismissed a case without considering documents 
on file relevant to the motion to dismiss. Had he known that the court would even 
consider such a thing, a motion to enlarge the time for filing or a motion to consider 
the late-filed documents would have been filed. 
This irregularity in the proceedings of the court, the abuse of discretion and 
the surprise involved in the court's obvious failure to consider the merits, then stating 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disingenuously that it did consider the merits thus prejudging the matter before it heard 
the arguments and carefully reviewed the affidavits and memoranda, with the natural 
disinclination to change the decision which it just announced constitutes grounds for 
reversal of the dismissal. 
POINT II 
DA's COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
COURT TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT. 
A motion to dismiss a complaint accepts all of the facts stated in the 
complaint as true. The standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim requires the Court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & 
Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 
264 (Utah 1995). 
The question, then, is do the facts stated in DA's complaint state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. The complaint has asked for relief in three 
alternative causes of action, one for quantum meruit-contract implied in fact, one for 
quantum meruit-contract implied in law and one for unjust enrichment. These are 
three alternative claims for unjust enrichment based upon the decided cases in the State 
of Utah. The principle of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment is well-recognized in 
Utah law. In Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734 P.2d 910 (1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Unjust enrichment is a doctrine under which the law will imply 
a promise to pay for goods or services when there is neither an 
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actual nor an implied contract between the parties. fThe 
promise is purely fictitious and is implied in order to fit the 
actual cause of action to the remedy." Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 
527 P.2d 651, 654-5 (Utah 1974). Three elements must be 
present before unjust enrichment may serve as a basis of 
recovery: There must be (1) a benefit conferred on one person 
by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee 
of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value. 
See also Berrett v. Stevens. 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984), which recognizes the same 
principle. Breitling Bros, v. Utah Golden Spikers. Inc.. 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979), 
stated that the gravamen of quantum meruit "is that one should be required to pay for 
benefits he has accepted." That case was remanded to determine what benefit was 
actually conferred. Some of the benefits which would qualify for unjust enrichment 
were identified by the Utah Supreme Court in the earlier case of Baugh v. Parley. 112 
Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337-8 (Utah 1947). Those benefits include "improvements to 
land," benefits which "increase the intrinsic value of the land," give the benefited party 
"legal rights which he did not previously have," "increase the value of his estate," "give 
him a position of greater security" or "remove a legal liability." 
The Court of Appeals, in Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987), 
has given its own explanation of the principle by setting forth two branches: 
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or 
unjust enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-
contract is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in 
restitution. See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §19, at 44, 46 
(1963). The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied 
in law, are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) 
under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant 
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to retain the benefit without paying for it. See Berrett v. 
Stevens. 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (using the term "unjust 
enrichment"). The measure of recovery under quasi-contract, 
or contract implied in law, is the value of the benefit conferred 
on the defendant (the defendant's gain) and not the detriment 
incurred by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 
683, 687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the reasonable value of the 
plaintiffs services. 
A contract implied in fact is the second branch of quantum 
meruit. A contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by 
conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §5 comment 
a (1981). The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the 
defendant requested the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the 
plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her for 
those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have 
known that the plaintiff expected compensation. 
The Supreme Court, however, has continued to use its own definition of the 
doctrine from its prior cases, that is, "(1) a benefit conferred; (2) an appreciation or 
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 
1234, 1248 (Utah 1998). In that case the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's 
finding of unjust enrichment where plaintiffs had improved land for their own benefit 
but the defendants also realized a benefit therefrom. In so concluding, the Court 
stated: 
First, the facts underlying an unjust enrichment claim are often 
complex and vary greatly from case to case. Indeed, by its very 
nature, the unjust enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact 
situations that did not fit within a particular legal standard but 
which nonetheless merited judicial intervention. [1244-5]. 
. . . the remedy of restitution is not confined to any particular 
circumstance or set of facts. It is, rather, a flexible, equitable 
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remedy available whenever the court finds that "the defendant, 
upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of 
natural justice and equity" to make compensation for benefits 
received. [1245; quoting from Murdock-Bryant Constr.. Inc. v. 
Pearson. 146 Ariz. 48, 703 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Ariz. 1985)]. 
Unjust enrichment law developed to remedy injustice when 
other areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment must 
remain a flexible and workable doctrine. [1245]. 
. . . a court need not find that the defendant intended to 
compensate the plaintiff for the services rendered or that the 
plaintiff intended that the defendant be the party to make 
compensation. This is because the duty to compensate for 
unjust enrichment is an obligation implied by law without 
reference to the intention of the parties. What is important is 
that it be shown that it was not intended or expected that the 
service be rendered or the benefit conferred gratuitously, and 
that the benefit was not "conferred officiously." [1246; quoting 
from Murdock-Bryant Constr.. above, at 1203]. 
As to the second element, the claimants plainly did not confer 
the services officiously. "Officiousness means interference in the 
affairs of another not justified by the circumstances under which 
the interference takes place." Restatement of Restitution § 2 
cmt. a (1937). Thus, an officious person is one who "thrust[s] 
benefits upon others." Id. Here, the claimants did not interfere 
or thrust benefits on the UEP. To the contrary, the UEP 
encouraged the claimants to improve the land. [1246]. 
Finally, the claimants did not confer their services gratuitously. 
One renders services gratuitously if at the time they were 
rendered, there was no expectation of "a return benefit, 
compensation, or consideration." Webster's New Int'l 
Dictionary 992 (3d ed. 1961); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d, 
Restitution § 26 (1973). [1246-7]. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court made some of the above statements with respect 
to Arizona law, it stated that "we find the analysis to be much the same" with respect 
to Utah law and arrived at the same conclusion under Utah law. 
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A review of the complaint in this case will show that the first and second 
causes of action satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment as defined by the Court of 
Appeals in Davies v. Olsen and all three causes of action satisfy the elements of unjust 
enrichment as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Jeffs v. Stubbs. A benefit has 
been conferred on Peaden. The benefit clearly falls within the list approved by the 
Supreme Court, that is, his land has been improved, the intrinsic value of his land has 
increased from a few hundred dollars to over $50,000 per lot, the value of his estate has 
been increased, and because he can now obtain a building permit on his lots and could 
not do so before, a legal right has been conferred upon him which he did not have 
before or a legal liability has been removed. Peaden knew or should have known of the 
benefit conferred. He was contacted in advance and encouraged plaintiff to proceed 
knowing of the benefit to him in doing so. In fact, he knew of the work being done and 
did nothing to prevent it which, in Jeffs v. Stubbs, at 1247, precludes one from claiming 
that the work was done gratuitously or officiously. Because D.A. benefitted only from 
the improvements to its lots and received no benefit from the improvements to 
Peaden's lots and because the benefit to Peaden is so substantial, it cannot reasonably 
be argued that the benefit to him was incidental. The ability of Peaden to obtain 
building permits on his lots is of absolutely no benefit to D.A. and that fact alone has 
increased the value of Peaden's lots from a few hundred dollars each to over $50,000 
each. That increase in value of Peaden's lots is of no benefit to D.A. but is a 
substantial benefit to Peaden. It is of interest to know that every other lot owner in the 
Foothills Subdivisions (with only one exception, who resides outside the state) has 
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recognized the benefit to them of these improvements and has paid for those benefits. 
Peaden is the only holdout. 
The complaint alleges that Peaden "requested [D.A.] to install the 
improvements which would also improve his lots" [Complaint, II 10, R. 3], that D.A. 
"expected [Peaden] to compensate it for such improvements" [Complaint, H 11, R. 3], 
and that Peaden "knew or should have known that [D.A.] expected to be so 
compensated" [Complaint, 1f 12, R. 3]. Thus, the Court of Appeals' definition of a 
contract implied in fact, one branch of quantum meruit, is clearly stated in the 
complaint. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that Peaden "received the benefit of six 
fully improved lots in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions on which building 
permits can now be obtained [Complaint, If 15, R. 3], Peaden "has an appreciation or 
knowledge of the benefit conferred upon him" [Complaint, If 16, R. 3], and "it would be 
unjust for the defendant to retain that benefit without paying for it." [Complaint, If 17, 
R. 3]. Thus, the Court of Appeals' definition of a contract implied in law, the other 
branch of quantum meruit, is also clearly stated in the complaint. 
In addition, the complaint alleges that a benefit was conferred on Peaden 
[Complaint, 1f1f 8 & 15, R. 2-3], that Peaden "had and has an appreciation or knowledge 
of the benefit conferred upon him" [Complaint, If 16, R. 3], and Peaden "has received, 
accepted and retained benefits which in equity and justice belong to [D.A.]" [Complaint, 
If 20, R. 3]. Thus, the Supreme Court's definition of unjust enrichment is clearly stated 
in the complaint. All of these allegations must be taken as true for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss. Therefore, the lower court's conclusion of law that the complaint 
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fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment [Order Dismissing Case, 1118, R. 187] is in 
error. 
POINT ffl 
DID THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDER 
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ON A MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE AN 
ANSWER WAS FILED RAISING THAT DEFENSE? 
The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing a summary judgment granted on a 
motion to dismiss, has stated "it is generally not well advised to treat a motion to 
dismiss as one for summary judgment." Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 
119, 122 (Utah 1977). In fact, in order to justify a dismissal, it must be demonstrated 
that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff might succeed. Olson v. Park-
Craig-Olson. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360-1 (Utah App. 1991). There are several sets of 
facts upon which plaintiff could succeed in avoiding the application of the statute of 
limitations and recovering under the unjust enrichment set forth in plaintiff's complaint. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the general rule that "affirmative 
defenses, which often raise issues outside of the complaint, are not generally 
appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Tucker v. State Farm 
Mutual 53 P.3d 947, 950 (Utah 2002). The Court then specifically held, at 951: 
Thus, in the narrow instance where a plaintiff's complaint 
describes events which establish when a statute of limitations 
begins to run but fails to explicitly set forth the relevant date on 
which those events occurred, a defendant may raise a statute of 
limitations defense in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of civil Procedure, provided that the trial court 
treats the motion as one for summary judgment, thus giving all 
parties the "reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion. . . . Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
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In this case, D.A. was not notified that the Court intended to treat the motion as one 
for summary judgment and did not have a reasonable opportunity to present all 
material pertinent and could not do so until discovery had been conducted relating to 
Peaden's presence in the State. It was impossible for the lower court to determine if 
the statute of limitations had been tolled by Peaden's absence from the State. [See §78-
12-35, U.C.A.]. There was no way for the court to determine, based on the facts stated 
in the complaint and the two documents submitted by Peaden, whether any of D.A.'s 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Since the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense, these questions do not arise until after Peaden has filed an answer 
to the complaint. 
For these reasons, it was improper for the lower court to treat the motion 
to dismiss raising the issue of the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations as one 
for summary judgment. 
POINT IV 
BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT, 
AND THE TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN, 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR DA.'S 
CLAIMS OF QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. 
Peaden's Motion to Dismiss is not supported by an affidavit asserting any 
facts which could be considered as evidence as to the application of the statute of 
limitations. The only "evidence" relied upon in the Motion to Dismiss is a Notice of 
Interest which makes no reference to the dates when any improvements were 
completed or to be completed and a Pre-Building Permit Report from Riverton City 
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which expressly states that some roads had not been asphalted and nowhere does it 
state that all required improvements were completed. Furthermore, that report applied 
only to lots in Plat B of The Foothills Subdivision and makes no reference to any lots 
in Plat C. Because the Notice of Interest does not give any dates for the installation 
of improvements, it was error for the lower court to conclude that the statute of 
limitations commenced to run no later than the date of that Notice of Interest. 
[Conclusion of Law 19, R. 187]. There is simply no evidence to indicate that the statute 
of limitations has run with respect to D.A.'s claim. Furthermore, even if some of the 
improvements installed by D.A. were barred by the statute of limitations, other 
improvements were not and there was no way for the Court to determine, based on the 
facts stated in the complaint and the two documents submitted by Peaden, what may 
be barred and what is not. It is also impossible for the Court to determine if the statute 
of limitations has been tolled by Peaden's absence from the State. [See §78-12-35, 
U.C.A.]. Since the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, these questions do 
not arise until after Peaden has filed an answer to the complaint asserting that defense. 
Peaden's Motion to Dismiss claimed that all of the improvements installed 
by D.A. were all installed in 1997. While some improvements were installed in 1997, 
many were installed in 1998 and 1999 and there is still work to be done consisting of 
repair to sidewalks damaged during construction and installation of street lights. 
[Young Affidavit, HIT 2, 4-5, R. 34-5]. Therefore, all of the improvements required to 
be installed by the City of Riverton have not yet been completed and the statute of 
limitations could not possibly have expired with respect to those improvements. 
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POINT V 
THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION OF UNCLEAN 
HANDS ON THE PART OF DA. IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
ANY EVIDENCE OR FINDING OF FACT. 
At the hearing on September 23,2002, the lower court stated that it was not 
relying on the equitable claim of unclean hands asserted by Peaden in granting the 
Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, Peaden's attorney included a conclusion of unclean 
hands in the Order Dismissing Case [Conclusion of Law 20, R. 187] and, over the 
objections of D.A. [Objections, 11 7, R. 178], the court signed the order including that 
conclusion. The asserted basis for that conclusion is the "undisputed fact that the 
plaintiff intentionally recorded its Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on defendant's property in January 1997 even through (sic) plaintiff knew, 
according to representations to the Court, that the improvements for which the Notice 
of Interest were recorded had not been made at that time." There is absolutely no 
evidence before the court to support such a finding and such a representation was not 
made to the court. [Objections, If 4, R. 177]. Again, the only "evidence" before the 
court on a motion to dismiss are the facts stated in the complaint, which are all taken 
as true for purposes of such a motion. There is no statement in the complaint that 
improvements had not been made at the time of the Notice of Interest. Therefore, 
there is no evidence upon which such a finding and conclusion could be based. 
Furthermore, it is a huge jump to conclude that D.A. had "unclean hands" 
just because it recorded the Notice of Interest. In fact, it is blatantly hypocritical for 
Peaden, who has received a huge benefit from D.A., by the improvements which 
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increased the value of his lots by approximately $270,000, which he refuses to pay for, 
to claim that D.A. has "unclean hands." He should be praising and thanking D.A. for 
conferring such a benefit on him. Instead, he is disingenuously "miffed" because they 
recorded a Notice of Interest against all of the improved lots, including his, which has 
since been released and did not, in any way, prevent him from selling his lots. He has, 
incidentally, sold at least two of his lots at a huge gain. It is his hands that are unclean 
and those hands are now slinging their mud at D.A. in an attempt to cover up his greed 
and inequitable conduct. 
A finding and conclusion of "unclean hands" surely would require the taking 
of some evidence from which such a finding could be made. It is impossible for the 
court to make such a finding from the facts stated in the complaint, which are the only 
facts before the court. 
The lower court's unsupported conclusion of unclean hands must be set 
aside and the decision based thereon reversed. 
POINT VI 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO 
CONSIDER DA.9S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTING A 
CLAIM FOR AN EQUITABLE LIEN. 
Because the lower court dismissed the case, it did not consider the 
Amended Complaint filed by D.A. which asserted an additional claim for an equitable 
lien against the lots owned by Peaden. That Amended Complaint should be considered 
by the court upon remand so that fair and appropriate relief may be granted to D.A. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court's Minute Entry Decision and Order of June 26, 2002, was 
irregularity in the proceedings, surprise or an abuse of discretion which prevented a fair 
trial or hearing. D.A.'s complaint stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment and 
it was error for the lower court to dismiss it. The lower court also committed error 
when it considered the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations on a motion to 
dismiss before an answer was filed raising that issue. There is insufficient evidence 
before the court to determine the applicability of the statute of limitations and it was 
error for the court to dismiss the complaint on that ground. The lower court further 
erred in concluding that D.A. had "unclean hands" since there was no evidence of any 
kind before the court which would support such a conclusion. This case should be 
reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits, including the claims in the Amended 
Complaint. 
DATED this J3J_ day of October, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ralph J. Marsh 1 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the 3 I day 0f October, 2003,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following: 
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P.O. Box 45385 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A Order Dismissing Case 
Exhibit B Minute Entry Decision and Order 
Exhibit C Motion to Amend Findings, For New 
Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment 
And For Relief from Judgment 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 




Civil No. 020902121 
HON. WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
A hearing came on before the Court in connection with the underlying motion to 
dismiss filed by defendant Gene Peaden in the above-captioned case. Ralph Marsh appeared 
on behalf of Development Associates, Inc. and Steven W. Call appeared on behalf of Gene 
Peaden. The Court had made its ruling in favor of defendant Peaden without a hearing but no 
order was signed and entered. After the Court made its minute entry, the plaintiff filed a 
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motion to alter and amend the Court's ruling. The motion was based on plaintiffs 
understanding that the Court's ruling was based on the premise that plaintiffs pleadings were 
not timely filed. At the hearing before the Court, the Court clarified and defendant's counsel 
confirmed, that the issue of timeliness was not being challenged, and that the Court's ruling 
should be based upon the merits of the issues raised in defendant's moving papers. The parties 
agreed that the Court would hear argument on the substantive issues raised in the defendant's 
moving papers. 
Now, the Court having considered the defendant's motion to dismiss, the memorandum 
of points and authorities filed in support and opposition thereto, the Affidavit of Steven R. 
Young (the plaintiffs president), the reply memorandum of points and authorities filed by 
defendant Peaden, and having heard the representations and argument of counsel and for cause 
appearing, the Court hereby makes its findings of uncontroverted facts, conclusions of law, 
and order of dismissal as follows. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are determined to be undisputed based upon the allegations made in 
the pleadings, the certified documents filed with the Court, the affidavit of Steven R. Young 
and/or the representations of counsel made at the hearing before the Court. 
1. Defendant Peaden owns lots 320, 322, and 334 of the Foothills Plat "B" according 
to the official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, and lots 
< 
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(hereinafter the "Notice of Interest'1). A copy of the Notice of Interest is attached as Exhibit B to 
defendant's support memorandum. 
7. The Notice of Interest was recorded against several lots in the Foothill Sub-
Division including but not limited to all of defendant's Property. The Notice of Interest 
provides, in part, as follows: 
The undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an 
interest in subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments, 
which benefit the following described property. 
8. The plaintiff represented to the Court at hearing that the foregoing Notice of 
Interest, which was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, was recorded by the 
plaintiff before the improvements to plats B and C of the sub-division, (which include the lots at 
issue in this action), were made. 
9. Plaintiffs counsel further represented to the Court at the hearing that the plaintiff 
would have previously removed its Notice of Interest against defendant's Property had such 
request been made pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had not been 
made to numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was filed. 
10. The certified report from Riverton City reflects that many of the improvements to 
Foothills plat B were made before the end of 1997. 
11. Defendant Peaden has never made any payment to the plaintiff for any of the 
alleged improvements made by the plaintiff to the development. 
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CONCLUSIONS OFLAW 
12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4 and/or § 78-33-1. 
13. The Court has in rem jurisdictional over the Property which is the subject of this 
action because the Property is located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
14. Venue is proper in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7, because the Property, which is the subject of this action, is located in 
• . ? • 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
15. The Court has considered the sworn affidavit of Steven Young and other 
extraneous materials, and therefore, defendant's motion may be considered a motion for 
summary judgment. However, even without the consideration of the affidavit and other 
extraneous materials, there are grounds which would sustain dismissal of all or part of plaintiff s 
complaint based upon the uncontested documents from the public record which were attached as 
exhibits to defendants support memorandum. 
16. As such, the Court should make an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint against 
defendant Peaden on several alternative grounds for failing to state a claim for relief under Utah 
law. 
17. First, the Restatement of Restitution § 106 provides that "[a] person who, 
incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or the improvement of his own 
things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution." 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to state 
a claim for unjust enrichment against defendant Peaden under Utah law. The indirect benefits 
which defendant received from plaintiffs work were merely incidental benefits, which occurred 
when the plaintiff undertook to make improvements to the development for plaintiffs own 
business purposes. 
19. Even if the complaint stated a claim for relief for unjust enrichment and/or an 
implied in fact contract, the four-year statute of limitations for any such claim has likely expired 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, which requires that such a claim be brought within four 
years. The facts are undisputed that defendant never made any payment to the plaintiff, and 
therefore the statute of limitations would have begun to run when the plaintiff first had a claim 
for relief that could have been alleged against the defendant for the improvements. Such time 
should have been no later than the date upon which the plaintiff filed its Notice of Interest on the 
public records of Salt Lake County, and in no event later than the date when the improvements 
were made. 
20. Even if the complaint stated a claim for unjust or an implied in fact contract and 
the claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the plaintiff is not entitled to a 
claim in equity against defendant Peaden because of its unclean hands. This is based upon the 
undisputed fact that the plaintiff intentionally recorded its Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder on defendant's Property in January 1997 even through plaintiff knew, 
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according to its representations to the Court, that the improvements for which the Notice of 
Interest were recorded had not been made at that time. 
21. Utah law does not allow for the filing of a notice of interest against another's 
property for alleged incidental improvements made thereto. The Court concludes that the proper 
method for filing a lien against another's property for improvements to real property should be 
made against such property pursuant to the procedures provided for in Utah Mechanics Lien Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 etseq. The Court concludes and plaintiff admitted to the Court at 
hearing that it did not comply with the Act. 
22. For the reasons set forth above plaintiffs Notice of Interest was not lawfully 
recorded against defendant's Property. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was converted (at least in part) to a motion 
for summary judgment, is hereby granted; 
2. Plaintiffs motion to alter and amend this Court's ruling is denied; 
3. Plaintiff motion for leave to file its amended complaint is moot, the Court having 
considered and ruled upon the merits of plaintiff s claims; 
4. Costs are hereby awarded to defendant Peaden pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
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5. This Order is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be signed and entered by 
the clerk of the Court. 
DATED this ^ day of \ J a d 2 W ^ 1 2002. 
HON. WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ralph B. Marsh 
Attorney for Development Associates, Inc. 
BY THE COURT: .-'' r ;X , \ 
J 
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I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
5*. day of November, 2002, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed [third revised] Order Dismissing Case was served by U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
673074/swc 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing [third revised] Order Dismissing Case was mailed by U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Steven W. Call 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
673074/swc 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOC., INC., 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
GENE PEADEN, an Individual 
Defendant, 
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
And ORDER 
CASE NO. 020902121 
JUDGE: WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Dated June 26,2002 
Before the Court is Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated 
April 8,2002 and Defendant's Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement filed on 
May 30. 2002, and submitted on its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having noted no timely opposition 
being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. This 
constitutes the Order of the Court 
Dated this _ day of viuW> 2002. 
WBB/mtr 
WMamB.Bohling r.:<*$£ 
District Judge i \ #~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020902121 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail STEVEN W CALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
36 SO STATE ST SUITE 
1400 
P.O. BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841450385 
Mail RALPH J. MARSH 
ATTORNEY PLA 
800 MCINTYRE BUILDING 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this J^f day of pjvu. , 20 £r2-r-
Out 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS, FOR NEW 
TRIAL, TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT AND FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020902121 
(Judge William B. Bohling) 
Plaintiff hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to amend the findings, pursuant to Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P., for a new 
trial, pursuant to Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P., to alter or amend the judgment, and pursuant 
to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., for relief from the judgment on the grounds set forth in the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, To Alter or 
Amend Judgment and for Relief From Judgment filed herewith. 
DATED this _£_ day of July, 2002. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the -9 day of July, 2002, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
AND FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the following: 
STEVEN W. CALL 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 
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